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Are You My Mother? 
A Judge's Decision in 
In Vitro Fertilization Surrogacy 
by Suzanne F. Seavello* 
H. Joseph Gitlin, an Illinois lawyer chairing the American 
Bar Assn. committee on surrogate parenting, noted that an old 
joke had become reality: A young woman tells her mom, "I'm 
pregnant, " and the older woman asks, "Are you sure you're the 
mother?"l 
The dream of starting one's own family is an integral part of Ameri-
can culture that is strongly reinforced by social norms? The reality is, 
however, that one out of every six couples ~s infertile.3 Many of these 
infertile couples choose alternative means of becoming parents, for exam-
ple, adoption, artificial insemination, and surrogacy. As these alternatives 
have developed, state legislatures and judges have generated bodies of 
law surrounding the practice of most of them. 
Of these alternatives, surrogacy does not yet have standard rules to 
guide the parties involved.4 Furthermore, since there are several types of 
* B.A. (Animal Physiology) 1986, U.c. San Diego; B.A. (psychology) 1986, U.c. 
San Diego; J.D. 1992, U.C. Hastings College of the Law. I thank Peter G. Linde for 
the late night typing sessions when he didn °t really have the time and my editors for 
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this note. I especially thank my mother, Ruth 
M. Seavello, for her constant encouragement and support. 
1. Martin Kasindorf, And Baby Makes Four, Johnson vs. Calvert Illustrates Just 
About Everything That Can Go Wrong in Surrogate Births, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 
1991, Magazine, at 10, 12. 
2. See JUDITH N. LASKER AND SUSAN BoRG, IN SEARCH OF PARENTHOOD, 11-14 
(1987); BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, REcREATING MOTHERHOOD 141-42 (1989). 
3. Philip C. Kissam, A Lawmaker's Guide to Reproductive-Freedoms - A Review 
of Reproductive Laws for the 1990's, 58 GEO. WA. L.R. 599, 612 (1990)(Kissam 
defmes "infertility" as the inability to conceive after one year of regular, unprotected 
intercourse). 
4. See, e.g., In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) and Adoption of 
Matthew B., 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239 (1991). Both courts applied adoption laws be-
cause there were no surrogacy laws. 
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surrogacy t different rules may apply to different methods. 
The most common fonn of surrogacy is "traditional" or "partial" 
surrogacy, which usually involves the artificial insemination of a woman 
with the spenn of an infertile woman's husband.s This situation is simi-
lar to adoption in that the "surrogate" mother is both the genetic mother 
(because she supplies the egg) and the gestational mother (because she 
gestates the fetus). Before conception, however, the mother voluntarily 
agrees to relinquish her parental rights, give the child to the father, and 
allow another woman to adopt it. Although this differs from adoption in 
the sense that the arrangement is made before conception, some adoption 
purposes, procedures, and laws may overlap with the purposes and needs 
of traditional surrogacy. Overlapping purposes, for example, are to pro-
vide the child with a stable home and parents who desperately want it 
and to consider the rights of the birth mother. 
Nineteen eighty-five marked the success of a new form of surrogacy: 
in vitro fertilization (IVF) surrogacy. 6 In this method, a ripe egg from a 
woman is mixed with semen for fertilization. 7 Once the fertilized egg 
begins to divide, it is then transferred to the uterus8 of a second woman 
for implantation and gestation. 
This article argues that IVF surrogacy splits the traditional role of the 
woman in reproduction and hence splits the definition of the word "moth-
er." Now there is a "genetic" mother and a separate "gestational" - or 
"birth" - mother. Reproduction of a child cannot be complete without 
both women's contributions. Stated simply, fertilizing the egg is the first 
step in reproduction, and gestation is the second step. 
IVF surrogacy thus is similar to adoption and traditional surrogacy in 
that the surrogate mother is the gestational mother. It is -similar to tradi-
tional surrogacy in that the agreement to relinquish parental rights is 
given before conception. IVF surrogacy differs from adoption and tradi-
tional surrogacy, however, because it allows both women to claim a role 
in the reproductive process. Thus, although IVF surrogacy, like traditional 
surrogacy, shares some purposes, laws and procedures with adoption, IVF 
surrogacy also overlaps in some ways with artificial insemination. For 
example, the parental rights of genetic donors should be considered in 
both artificial insemination and IVF surrogacy. Even with these overlap-
ping areas of adoption and artificial insemination, neither body of law is 
adequate to cover all of the new rights and responsibilities created in the 
5. Developments in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. 
REv. 1519, 1546 [hereinafter Developments]; see also Kasindorf, supra note 1, at 13. 
6. Linda Rapattoni, Surrogate Mother Carrying Another Woman IS Baby, UPI, Nov. 
28, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file. 
7. MARY WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE 29 (1985). 
8. fd. 
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three adults and the child involved in IVF surrogacy. 
In 1989, four years after the first successful pregnancy from in vitro 
fertilization surrogacy, the first custody battle for a child conceived by 
this method was litigated in California with the case of Anna J. v. Mark 
C. et al. 9 [hereinafter Johnson]. In this case, the gestational mother, An-
na Johnson, claimed to have bonded with the baby in her uterus. 10 John-
son filed an "action to be declared the mother of the child,',ll and the 
parties were forced to litigate. The trial court held that Johnson "had no 
'parental' rights. ,,12 The appellate court applied the California rules on 
genetic paternity determinationl3 to this woman's non-genetic claim to 
the child and upheld the lower court's decision. 
This article argues that the appellate court improperly applied a set of 
genetic determination rules to a non-genetic determination situation. The 
court did not have a surrogacy statute to define the proper issues and 
course of action. In vitro fertilization surrogacy is a means of becoming a 
parent independent of and alternative to adoption, artificial insemination, 
and traditional surrogacy. It should create different sets of rights and 
responsibilities in the participants because the method splits the mother's 
reproductive role into two separate roles. Also, the parental determination 
tests commonly relied on today are inadequate for IVF surrogacy situa-
tions because they were not designed to detect the pure gestational role in 
reproduction. Application of paternity laws, or other means of creating 
families, to in vitro fertilization surrogacy is improper, and a uniform 
statute regulating in vitro fertilization surrogacy is necessary to define the 
rights of all parties involved. 
To fully explain why these laws are inadequate when applied to in 
vitro fertilization surrogacy and to propose a uniform solution, Part I of 
this article discusses the purposes, procedures, and laws behind several 
alternatives presently available to infertile couples. Part II examines how 
the laws of alternative means of creating a family were applied in the 
Johnson IVF surrogacy case and analyzes two reasons why this applica-
tion was inappropriate. First, the court applied a genetic test to see if 
Anna Johnson was the mother after she had stipulated that she did not 
donate the egg. Second, the court did not agree that there are two aspects 
9. 6 Cal. App. 4th 521 (1991). The original cite for this case, 234 Cal. App. 3d 
1557, has been omitted. It is reprinted without change in 6 Cal. App. 4th 521 to per-
mit tracking pending review by the California Supreme Court. 
10. Kasindorf, supra note I, at 12. 
11. 6 Cal. App. 4th at 528. 
12. ld 
13. "Any interested party may bring an action to determine the existence or nonex-
istence of a mother and child relationship. Insofar as practicable, the provisions of 
this part applicable to the father and child relationship apply." CAL. CN. CODE § 
7015 (West Supp. 1991)(emphasis added). See also 6 CaL App. 4th at 530. 
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to reproduction - supplying the genetic material' and then gestating the 
embryo into the fetus - both of which merit parental status to the con-
tributor. 
Three types of arguments are given to support this dual view of re-
production: first, this section repeats arguments given by physicians in 
support of the gestational mother's parental status. Second, this section 
argues against the trial court's determination that the gestational mother is 
a foster mother, baby sitter, or incubator, by discussing aspects of gesta-
tion that show she is an active participant in reproduction, as opposed to 
a caretaker of another independent human being. Third, this section ex-
amines commentators' theories on why the court chose to discount the 
importance of the role gestation plays in child reproduction. 
Part m describes the approaches taken by a few states that have 
legislation directed toward in vitro fertilization surrogacy. Finally, this 
article sets forth proposals for a uniform in vitro fertilization surrogacy 
code that recognizes the importance of gestation in the reproductive pro-
cess. 
I. BACKGROUND: ALTERNATIVES FOR 
INFERTILE COUPLES 
There are several alternatives for infertile couples. To establish a 
foundation for a proposal for an IVF surrogacy statute, this article begins 
with a broad look at adoption, artificial insemination, traditional surroga-
cy, and in vitro fertilization surrogacy and the laws that govern them. 
A. ADoPTION 
Legal adoption is the practice of a couple accepting a child as their 
own, with each member having all the rights and responsibilities of natu-
ral family members. 14 The primary purpose of adoption can be viewed 
as "providing stable family relationships for the children who need 
them.n1S 
Adoption procedures vary from state to state, although some states 
model their procedures after the Uniform Adoption ACt. 16 Generally, 
14. 
Adoption is the legal process by which a child acquires parents other 
than his natural parents and parents acquire a child other than a natu-
ral child. As a result of the adoption decree the legal rights and obli-
gations which fonnerly existed between the child and his natural par-
ents come to an end, and are replaced by similar rights and obliga-
tions with respect to his new adoptive parents. 
HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 850 
(2d ed. 1988). 
15. Id. at 854. 
16. See, e.g., UNIF. ADoPTION ACT, 9 Part I U.L.A. 11 (1988). See also comments 
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states require: a petition by prospective parents,17 an agency investiga-
tion of the child's and the adoptive parents' backgrounds,t8 and a hear-
ing before a court. 19 These procedures produce one of three results: (1) 
issuance of a final decree of adoption;20 (2) issuance of an interlocutory 
decree of adoption, "which by its own tenns automatically becomes a 
fmal decree of adoption on a day therein specified, which day shall not 
be less than 6 months nor more than one year from the date of issuance 
of the decree";21 or (3) "dismiss[al of] the petition and determin[ation 
of] the person to have custody of the minor, including the petitioner if in 
the best interest of the minor. "22 
Many adoption statutes recognize the strong bond between the mother 
and the newborn by providing "that the [mother's] consent [to adopt] 
may not be given earlier than a specific period after the child is born . .,23 
If the mother consents to the adoption before the child is born, there is 
"serious risk that the natural parent, once the child is born, will have 
second thoughts about giving him up and will attempt to revoke the 
consent. "24 
Some state statutes allow the natural parent to revoke consent after 
the child has been adopted only by approval of the court on the showing 
of something more than a change of mind, for example, fraud or du-
ress.25 In determining revocation of consent, some courts emphasize the 
child's interest "in a stable, continuing relationship with his psychological 
parents. ,,26 Courts also consider the stability of the environment for the 
child and the avoidance of hardship to the prospective adoptive parents 
when considering whether to grant a revocation of consent. 27 
Adoption, alone, is not the answer for all couples. Impediments to 
to each section of the act describing variations among the adopting jurisdictions. 
17. See, e.g., VNIF. ADoPTION Acr § 8, 9 Part I V.L.A. 43 (1988). 
18. See, e.g., id. § 11(b). 
19. See, e.g., id. § 13. 
20. See, e.g., id. § 13(c). 
21. See, e.g., id. § 13(c). "In an interlocutory decree of adoption the Court may 
provide for observation, investigation, and further report on the adoptive home during 
the interlocutory period." ld. § 13 (d). 
22. See, e.g., id. § 13(d). 
23. CLARK, supra note 14, at 879; see also VNIF. ADoPTION Acr § 7 (a), 9 Part I 
V.L.A. 39 (1988)(lbe required consent to adoption shall be executed at any time 
after the birth of the child"). 
24. CLARK, supra note 14, at 879. 
25. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1513 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992)(even if 
the action is based on fraud or duress, it may not be commenced after twelve months 
from the date the consent or surrender was executed). 
26. CLARK, supra note 14, at 885. The text implies that "psychological" refers to 
the parents with whom the child has been living and to whom the child is emotion-
ally attached. This can be either the natural or adoptive parents. 
27. ld. 
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adoption are increasing: fewer babies are available for adoption, while 
there were between 500,000 and 1 million number of infertile couples as 
of December 1982.28 The level of scrutiny that couples must endure un-
der adoption procedures can also prevent many couples from starting their 
families. For example, parents of different religions who are also an older 
couple may fmd adoption of a newborn infant extremely difficult.29 Fur-
thermore, research has shown that some adopted children manifest learn-
ing difficulties, behavioral and psychological problems, and confusion 
about their identities and genetic backgrounds. 30 
B. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND SPERM DONATION 
Artificial insemination (AI) is "the placing of semen inside a 
woman's vagina or uterus by means other than sexual intercourse.,,31 
This technique is used for couples in which the man is partially infertile 
or is unable to achieve intercourse32 or where there is no male partner. 
These possibilities have led to two basic types of artificial insemination: 
artificial insemination by husband (AIH)33 or artificial insemination by 
donor (AID, also known as sperm donation).34 
Artificial insemination involves a relatively simple procedure. First, 
semen is collected from the husband or donor through masturbation. 35 
The semen can then be used fresh, or it can immediately be frozen for 
future use.36 At the proper time in the ovulation cycle the sperm is then 
placed or injected into the woman's uterus.37 It is not necessary for the 
woman to know the sperm donor. She may go to a sperm bank to select 
a donor who has already had his sperm frozen for this purpose. 
Consent of the natural father is usually not an issue in AI. Whether 
the arrangement is made informally between friends or formally through a 
sperm bank, the donor consents to have his sperm used for reproduction 
when he provides it. 
Extinguishing the donor's parental rights is more complicated, howev-
er. In informal situations, the parties decide the issue among themselves. 
In some sperm banks, the donors sign a consent and release of parental 
28. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1136 (1987). 
29. Id. at 1139. 
30. Robert Hanley, Bonding is Described at Baby M Hearing, N.Y. nMES, Feb. 28, 
1987, § 1, 34. 
31. WARNOCK, supra note 7, at 17. 
32. Id. 
33. If the man is not completely infertile, his semen may be concentrated in the 
lab and then inseminated into the woman. Id. 
34. Id. at 18. 
35. Id. at 17. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
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rights form. In Sweden, "[t]he law equates AID with adoption, so the 
donor has a socially recognized position, though one without rights. ,.38 
Should the sperm donor change his mind and wish to revoke his 
consent to give up his parental rights, courts appear to decide the issue 
based on the mother9s marital status. When the woman receiving the 
sperm is married, courts are inclined to terminate the sperm donoes pa-
rental rights because the state has "a long-recognized social policy of 
preserving the integrity of the marriage ... 39 Case law indicates that "leg-
islation . . . extinguishes the legal paternal rights of the donor and estab-
lishes the legal paternity of the husband of the recipienC9 if the recipient's 
mate has the intention, formed "prior to conception, of functioning as the 
child's father:940 With the use of AID by single women who know the 
donors, however, the courts have given parental rights to the sperm do-
nors.41 
Some ethical concerns of AID have been addressed by the Ethics 
Committee of the American Fertility Society. After evaluating AID, the 
organization established specific guidelines and recommendations empha-
sizing: "(1) informed consent; (2) psychiatric counselling [for the recipi-
ent]; (3) maintenance of a permanent record designed to preserve ano-
nymity and confidentiality; (4) limitation of the same donor to a maxi-
mum of ten offspring; and (5) scrupulous attention to genetic and health 
'screening of sperm donors. 9942 
Artificial insemination is a controversial subject. Many people believe 
that even AnI is an "unwarranted deviation from the natural processes of 
intercourse"; 43 others believe masturbation is wrong.44 In 1948, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury recommended that AID be made a criminal 
offense.45 
C. SURROGACY 
Surrogacy is used when there is no female partner or when she is 
infertile. Two forms are discussed below: traditional surrogacy and in 
38. JONATHAN GLOVER, ETHICS OF NEW REPRODUCTIVE TEcHNOLOOIES 35 (1989). 
39. Jhordn C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 395 (1986). 
40. Book Review, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1177, 1178 (1990)(reviewing CARMEL 
SHALEV, BIRTH PoWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989» [hereinafter SHALEV]. 
41. See, e.g., C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 824 (1977)(courts prefer children to 
have two parents) and Jhordn C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 387 (1986)(even 
though paternity statutes protect married women from parental claims of sperm donors, 
it is not a denial of equal protection to deny the same protection to unmarried wom-
en). 
42. Elizabeth Rose Stanton, The Rights of the Biological Father: From Adoption 
and Custody to Surrogate Motherhood, 12 VT. L. REv. 87, 98 n.86 (1987). 
43. WARNOCK, supra note 7, at 18. 
44. Id 
45. Id at 19. 
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vitro fertilization. 
1. Traditional surrogacy 
The most common fonn of surrogacy is "traditional" or "partiar' 
surrogacy, which usually involves the artificial insemination of a second 
woman with the spenn of an infertile woman's husband.46 The infertile 
woman may be unable to carry a child for physical or health reasons, or 
she may be unable to produce eggs. The second woman voluntarily signs 
a pre-conception contract relinquishing her parental rights41 and prom-
ising to surrender the child to the genetic father after the birth. She is 
paid41 for the nine months of physical and emotional work in develop-
ing and giving birth to the child. 
Just as in adoption, the second woman is both the genetic mother, 
because she supplies the egg, and the gestational mother. However, this 
traditional surrogacy arrangement is unlike adoption in that pre-birth 
contracts are valid; in adoption they are void.49 An additional difference 
between adoption and traditional surrogacy is that traditional surrogacy is 
intended to aid infertile families in reproducing a genetic child of their 
own, whereas one purpose of adoption is to fmd stable homes for chil-
dren who are already in existence. so 
Surrogacy arrangements may be fonnal or infonnal. Infonnally, a 
couple may ask a friend, relative, or acquaintance to be their surrogate. 
Before conception the surrogate may be asked to sign a contract relin-
quishing her parental rights to the child after it is born and/or to sign an 
adoption release. Alternatively, fonnal procedures may be followed, as in 
the cases of Baby ~l and Adoption of Matthew B.52 In both cases, the 
married couples went to a professional organization incorporated for the 
purpose of matching infertile couples with surrogate mothers. These orga-
nizations "screen" potential surrogate mothers. 53 
In Baby M the mother signed a contract before insemination, agreeing 
to relinquish the child to the father and thereafter to do whatever was 
46. Developments, supra note 5, at 1546. 
47. fd. 
48. fd. at 1546 n.l35 (gestational mothers are paid approximately $10,000 plus 
medical and legal expenses). 
49. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24. 
50. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15. 
51. 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (1988). 
52. 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239, 1251 (1991). 
53. Kasindorf. supra note 1, at 14. Some clients have filed complaints accusing 
brokers of negligence in their screening process. fd. See also Stiver v. Parker, 61 
U.S.L.W. 1041 (6th Cir. 1992)(in holding that contracting parents may sue a surroga-
cy "broker" for negligence, the court said that those who arrange surrogate parent 
contracts must exercise a higher degree of care to protect the contracting parties 
because of the risky nature of surrogacy contracts). 
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necessary to terminate her maternal rights. S4 Three days after the birth, 
the mother gave the child to the father and his wife. 55 On that evening, 
however, the mother realized that she could not live without her child,S6 
and a complicated battle for custody began. 
New Jersey appellate court Judge Sorkow held that the contract was 
valid and enforceable57 and that the child's best interests were served by 
placing her in her father's sole custody. 58 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court decided to follow the rules of adoption, however, and held that the 
contract conflicted with laws prohibiting the use of money in connection 
with adoptions, laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment 
before parental rights are terminated or adoption is granted, and laws 
making surrender of custody and consent to adoption revocable in pri-
vate-placement adoptions. 59 It held that the contract conflicted with state 
public policy. 60 The court also held that the natural (genetic and gesta-
tional) mother was "inappropriately called the 'surrogate mother,'" found 
no legal adoption, and restored her visitation rights. 61 The court then 
urged the state legislature to create a statute to govern surrogacy. 
In Adoption of Matthew B. the "surrogate" mother signed the surro-
gate contract on June 17, 1985, and the child was born on September 1. 
1986.62 Three days later the mother signed an adoption release, and the 
father received sole custody of the child.63 Almost ten months later, the 
mother petitioned to revoke her consent to the step-parent adoption by the 
father's wife.64 
Like the New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby M,65 this California 
court based its decision on adoption law. The California court, however, 
held the adoption consent to be valid and denied the natural mother any 
further visitation with the child. 66 
Aside from these legal uncertainties and problems that the contracting 
parties face, the difficulties that the child might face must also be taken 
into consideration. Since studies of the effects of surrogate arrangements 
on children's lives have not been conducted, we can only speculate on 
possible types of harm. There is a "strong fear" among child welfare 
54. 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (1988). 
55. ld at 1236. 
56. ld at 1236-37. 
57. 525 A.2d 1128, 1166 (1987). 
58. ld at 1170. 
59. 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). 
60. ld 
61. ld at 1234-35. 
62. 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239, 1252 (1991). 
63. ld 
64. Id at 1253. 
65. 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). 
66. 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239, 1239-40 (1991). 
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experts that children from surrogacy arrangements may experience prob-
lems similar to those that some adopted children have: confusion about 
their identities and genetic backgrounds, learning difficulties, and behav-
ioral and psychological problems. 67 
2. In vitro fertilization (IVF) surrogacy 
In vitro fertilization can be used by couples who have trouble con-
ceiving naturally.68 In IVF surrogacy, ripe eggs taken from the woman 
are mixed with semen for fertilization.69 Once the fertilized egg has 
started to divide, it is then transferred back to the uterus of the same 
woman for implantation and gestation.10 The first successful "test-tube 
baby," Louise Brown, was born in England in 1978.11 
In IVF surrogacy, the woman supplying the egg cannot carry the 
child. She may have fallopian tube problems12 or possibly have had a 
partial hysterectomy.13 Her egg is fertilized with her husband's sperm 
and then transferred to the uterus of a second woman for implantation 
and gestation. Couples choose IVF surrogacy over traditional surrogacy 
because it provides a genetic link between both parents and the child.14 
The first successful birth using in vitro fertilization surrogacy was in 
1985.15 "Since [1981], more than 10,000 babies have been conceived 
using in vitro fertilization. "16 Although this new method may give hope 
to many infertile couples, only ten to fourteen percent of attempts result 
in successful live births.l1 Furthermore, IVF surrogacy presents several 
difficulties beyond those arising in traditional surrogacy. It is a complicat-
ed, time-consuming, and physically taxing procedure. 18 Some of the 
drugs given to genetic mothers to induce ovulation may cause side ef-
fects, such as swelling, nausea, diarrhea, stomachaches, weight gain, burst 
67. Hanley, supra note 30. 
68. WARNOCK, supra note 7, at 29 (discussing IVF as a recent development for 
women with fallopian tube problems who may bear their own children with this 
technology) and at 42 (discussing IVF as a form of surrogacy). 
69. Id. at 29. 
70. Id. 
71. Roy Carleton Howell, Kenyan Jurisprudence: The Answer to Western Regulation 
of "In-Vitro-Fertilization," 17 S.u. L. REv. 69, 79 (1990). 
72. WARNOCK, supra note 7, at 29. 
73. Kasindorf, supra note 1, at 14. 
74. See, e.g., id. at 14 (in Johnson, the genetic father gave his reason for choosing 
IVF surrogacy: "With Chris' [the genetic mother1 personality ... we really wanted a 
child that had her innocence, her sweetness, her demeanor"). 
75. Rapattoni, supra note 6. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. (fourteen percent); see also Developments, supra note 5, at 1539-40 n.93 
(ten to twelve percent). 
78. Developments, supra note 5, at 1540. 
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ovaries, and risk of death. 79 
Just as in traditional surrogacy, there are professional organizations 
incorporated to match potential parents with gestational mothers. so In the 
Johnson case,81 however, the genetic parents, the Calverts, chose to by-
pass the professionals and make the in vitro fertilization arrangement with 
one of the wife9s co-workers.s2 
At that time, California did not have a statute on surrogacy - either 
traditional or IVF - to distinguish the rights of the parties. Johnson did 
not agree to file an adoption consent. She signed a surrogacy contract in 
which she agreed "neither to form or attempt to form a parent-child rela-
tionship,.s3 and to give the child to the genetic parents after birth. The 
contract cautioned that, because surrogate parenting is "a new and unset-
tled area of the law;9 its provisions "may be declared void as against 
public policy by the California COUrts.,.84 
When Johnson decided to keep the child, she filed an action asking 
for maternal rights. S5 In the two traditional surrogacy cases discussed 
earlier, S6 the mothers signed surrogacy contracts, and one signed an 
adoption release form. The two courts then decided the cases using adop-
tion law. But in Johnson, the trial court bypassed adoption law and de-
cided the surrogacy contract Johnson had signed was valid. 
Even so, this court still had a decision to make: Is a gestational 
mother (Johnson) entitled to maternal rights for her contribution to the 
reproductive process? Johnson9s California trial court decided that the 
gestational mother was not to be considered a parent, but an "environ-
ment, ,.S7 a "home;9s8 and more like a foster mothers9 than a true 
mother. The appellate court did not consider her a parent because she did 
not pass California's genetic paternity test. 90 Consequently, a gestational 
mother never has a right to revoke her consent to giving up the child she 
carries because the child she carries does not belong to her in any man-
ner. 
79. Id. at 1540 n.99. 
80. See generally Kasindorf. supra note 1 (discussing brokers throughout the text). 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13. 
82. Kasindorf, supra note I, at 16. 
83. Id. at 30. 
84. Id. 
85. 6 Cal. App. 4th 521, 528 (1991). 
86. See supra text accompanying notes 51-66. 
87. Katha Pollitt, When is a Mother Not a Mother; Surrogate Mother Case of Anna 
Johnson, THE NATION, Dec. 31, 1990, at 825. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. "Foster. .. [A]ffording, receiving, or sharing nurture or parental care 
though not related by blood or legal ties." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 487 (1983). 
90. 6 Cal. App. 4th 521, 530-33 (1991). 
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This was a brief discussion of several alternative ways for infertile 
couples to create a family and the laws, or lack of laws, governing them. 
Next, this article examines how these laws and their application affected 
the Johnson case. 
II. APPLICATION OF LAW AND 
THE REASONING IN JOHNSON 
Having no laws governing IVF surrogacy, both the trial and appellate 
courts deciding Johnson applied the current California civil and evidence 
codes to detennine which woman was the "true" mother. 
The trial court found the contract valid and likened the gestational 
mother to an "environment. ",91 The appellate court applied California 
Civil Code § 7015: "Any interested party may bring an action to deter-
mine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship. 
Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this part applicable to the father 
and child relationship apply.",92 The provisions the appellate court ap-
plied included California Evidence Code § 621, a paternity test that de-
fmes the natural father as the man whose blood matches the child's ge-
netic markers.93 The appellate court concluded that Johnson could not be 
a "natural'" mother because the g~netic markers in her blood did not 
match the child's. 94 
This article argues that it is not practical to apply laws applicable to 
the father and child relationship in IVF surrogacy situations for two rea-
sons: fust, blood testing of the gestational mother to detennine genetic 
relationship provides no new evidence since it is already stipulated that 
she has not contributed the egg. Second, even though a gestational moth-
er is not genetically related to the child, her contribution during the re-
productive process refutes the theory that she merely provides an environ-
ment and in fact qualifies her as a natural parent. 
It is not helpful to search for genetic markers in the gestational 
mother's blood. A man fathers a child by contributing his sperm; there-
fore, genetic testing is a reliable means of ascertaining paternity. If the 
issue litigated here was who donated the egg, then by analogy this law 
would apply. But this issue was not disputed: Johnson stipulated that the 
woman who donated the egg had the genetic relationship to the child.9s 
By applying rules that relate only to paternal bonds, the court ignored 
91. Pollitt, supra note 87. 
92. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7015 (West Supp. 1991)(emphasis added). 
93. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1991). 
94. 6 Cal. App. 4th 521, 533 (1991). 
95. Id. 
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the contributions to reproduction that only women perfonn.96 Since IVF 
surrogacy splits the woman's role in reproduction into separate stages 
executed independently by two women - a genetic participant and a 
gestational participant - the issue becomes: Is each of the women par-
ticipating to be considered a "mother"? In the Johnson case, only one of 
the women's roles was litigated - what maternal rights a woman may 
receive from her gestational contributions. Yet the court did not adequate-
ly analyze this contribution; it merely applied law pertaining only to the 
undisputed genetic contribution. 
This article argues that if it takes three people to make a baby, then 
there are three parents. When the child was born, "William Steiner, the 
baby's guardian for legal purposes," ordered the hospital to "treat the 
baby as if he has three parents" and allowed frequent visits by the genetic 
parents.97 But the court reasoned differently. Trial court Judge Parslow 
acknowledged Johnson's "substantial contribution" and that "[i]t took the 
three of them to get the child here.,,98 However, he stated his belief that 
Anna was not a natural parent, saying "right up front" that he had no "in-
tention to split this baby into two emotional situations [to] be raised by 
two mothers. ,,99 He said that he has heard a lot from experts about ge-
netics, that the gestational environment is still not clear, and that three 
natural parents is not in the best interests of the child and "is ripe for 
crazy making."IOO It is unclear whether Judge Parslow found Johnson 
had no parental rights because her contribution was not substantial 
enough, because he believes that three people creating a child makes two 
parents, or because it was not in the child's best interests. 
The appellate court's conclusion that the gestational contributor could 
not be considered the child's mother is also inconsistent with some of the 
evidence it acknowledged. The court acknowledged, for example, the 
argument by the American Civil Liberties Union that the gestational 
contribution was "profound," 101 yet the court did not comment further 
on this point. In addition, when the court was making its determination of 
maternity it relied on the statement that "[g]enes determine the way phys-
iological components of the human body, such as the heart, liver, or 
96. Pollitt, supra note 87. 
97. Catherine Gewertz, Surrogate Gives Birth to Boy, Custody Fight, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 20, 1990, at A3. 
98. Calif. Judge Speaks on Issue of Surrogacy, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 36. 
99. Id (emphasis added). 
100. Id. He also found that if Johnson did have parental rights, "in this case they 
were relinquished." Id. He went as far as to say that the contract "is enforceable by 
either specific performance, arguably even by habeas corpus if neoossaty." Id. 
(compare to § B9 of the proposed statute at the end of this article). 
101. 6 Cal. App. 4th 521, 573 (1991). 
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blood vessels operate."l02 Earlier in the opinion, however, the court 
stated that the woman "for good or ill, can permanently affect the child 
by what she ingests,"103 thereby acknowledging that events during ges-
tation can determine the way physiologic components operate. 
The court also considered "irrelevant" the opinion of the Committee 
on Ethics of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
which viewed "the genetic link between the commissioning parents and 
the resulting infant, while important, [to be] less weighty than the link 
between surrogate mother and fetus."l04 
Both Johnson courts acknowledged the importance of the gestational 
mother's contribution, yet neither found she had parental status. This 
article argues that the reasoning of these California courts is wrong and 
that there is a need for an IVF surrogacy statute that reflects the follow-
ing two positions. First, the gestational mother should be afforded mater-
nal rights. This position is supported in the following section. Second, 
some of the parental rights and duties in IVF surrogacy are different from 
those in adoption and sperm donation. When these differences are not 
considered, the gestational mother's rights are not adequately protected 
because she is not recognized as providing a parental contribution under 
current case law. 
m. THE DILEMMA OF 
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION SURROGACY: 
CREATION OF A THIRD NATURAL PARENT 
One of the questions raised by in vitro fertilization is: "Who is within 
the ~mother and child relationship?,"l03 In traditional surrogacy, a wom-
an is usually artificially inseminated with the sperm of the infertile 
woman's husband. In this situation, there are two natural parents: the man 
who supplied the sperm and the woman who supplied the egg, was in-
seminated, and carried the child to term. After this genetic and gestational 
mother relinquishes her legal maternal rights and turns the child over to 
the father, the infertile woman adopts the child. In California, case law 
(Adoption of Matthew B. l~ shows that following a statutory period, 
this procedure irrevocably creates only two legal parents. 
IVF surrogacy, however, creates a different situation because a second 
woman is involved to gestate the fertilized egg. The couple has one of 
their eggs fertilized with their sperm and then transferred to a second 
102. Id. at 540. 
103. Id. at 537. 
104. Id. at 540. 
105. Id. at 530. 
106. See supra text accompanying note 62-66. 
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woman. It is already agreed that the fertilized egg makes both of the 
genetic contributors parents. But the following physicians' testimony, 
description of the gestational mother's participation in the reproductive 
process, and authors' comments all make the further point: gestation is 
also a parental contribution that is just as vital to producing a healthy 
child as the genetic contribution and thereby creates a third natural par-
ent. IVF surrogacy statutes must, therefore, address the fact that the ges-
tational mother is contracting to renounce her parental rights in favor of 
the other parents, just as in traditional surrogacy and adoption. Statutes 
should not treat her like an environment or an incubator, neither of which 
has legal rights or responsibilities, because this would cast the gestational 
mother in the role of an object. 
A. PHYsICIANs' TESTIMONY 
The Johnson trial court's comparison of a woman gestating a fetus to 
an "environmentttlO7 (or as commentators have said, an "incubator,,)los 
is too simplistic to describe the dynamic physical relationship between a 
woman and the child she is gestating, whether or not the original egg 
carries her genetic material. This section attempts to answer the question: 
Does a pregnant woman actively participate in the creation of a baby, or 
does she just incubate the fertilized egg "until it fmally 'hatches,?"l09 
A defmition will be helpful here. An incubator is "an apparatus pro-
viding suitable conditions (e.g. warmth and moisture) for incubating 
something ... 110 To incubate means "to sit upon eggs to hatch them; also: 
to keep (as eggs) under conditions favorable for development."lll An 
incubator does not dynamically interact with a chicken egg as a woman 
dynamically interacts with and contributes to the child developing inside 
her. 
Dr. Michelle Harrison, a physician, psychiatrist, and expert witness in 
the Johnson case, explained the difference between gestation by a woman 
and the use of chicken incubators that are kept in zoos: 
107. Pollitt, supra note 87. 
108. See, e.g., Michelle Harrison, Anna Johnson is a Mother, Not Just an Incubator, 
CHI. TRm., Oct. 8, 1990, at C13. See also Sonni Efron and Kevin Johnson, Decision 
Hailed as Proper, Criticized as Outrageous, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1990, at AI: 
Alexander M. Capron, a renowned medical ethicist who teaches law 
and medicine at USC, acknowledged that infertile couples need options 
but said that forcing a woman to comply with a contract to give up a 
child she bore "turns a child into a commodity and a woman into a 
machine." 
109. Harrison, supra note 108, at C13. 
110. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICfIONARY 360 (3d ed. 1974). 
111. Id 
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The fertilized bird egg that one watches in these incubators comes 
with enough nutrient to carry it through its entire gestation. The 
human fertilized egg comes with only enough nutrition to last the 
growing embryo about ten days, and then it must attach itself to 
the uterus or it will cease to exist. Unlike the hard shell of the 
bird's egg, however, the fertilized human egg is surrounded only 
by a thin membrane, Therefore, it must establish a dynamic rela-
tionship in which the woman's body meets its need for fluids, 
oxygen and nutrients, clears natural wastes from its system, and 
protects it from potentially harmful toxic and physical condi-
tions ... While one can trace Matthew's genes to the Calverts, it 
is his umbilical cord to his mother upon which his life depended 
However much the donors of a fertilized egg may want a baby 
that the egg and sperm began, they did not undergo the biologi-
cal process by which that child was formed·, . , It demeans the 
biologic mother to say she is not the mother. Genetic parenthood 
and biologic motherhood are not synonymous. One simply cannot 
pretend that a pregnant woman's nurturing of a fetus can be re-
duced to incubation. 112 
112. Harrison, supra note 108 (emphasis added). Dr. Harrison further states: 
Anna Johnson believes she is the mother of the baby boy she 
delivered September 19. While she probably wishes she could give the 
Calverts back their embryo, that embryo does not exist anymore. 
Anna's 3-year-old daughter never got attached to the embryo. But 
then her mother's body began to swell and the new baby competed 
for room on mommy's lap. The 3-year-old felt the kicking of the 
baby and said, "My brother's name is Matthew." 
[To the woman, the embryo starts as a stranger and] becomes a 
part of her self . . , For the slowly evolving fetus, home is the place 
filled with mother's warmth and cushioned by her fluids. It is the 
place where her appetite feeds both of them, her liver filters toxins 
for both of them, her lungs breathe for both of them. In the last 
months, the fetus hears her singing, her talking, her crying. At birth 
the newborn shows preference for her voice above all others. 
Dr. Harrison also discussed the role of genes verses the role of gestation: 
From fertilized egg to delivery of the baby, a human embryo 
grows 4,500 times in length and more than a billion times in weight. 
What is the role of DNA in this process? A baby at birth is not 
just an enlarged embryo. DNA represents blueprints for a baby, sub-
ject to modification in the womb. As with plans for a house, the 
coding tells how the essential structure is to be built, which beams go 
where, and so on. DNA describes the intended structure, while the 
pregnant woman builds it. The embryo becomes a fetus with a heart 
that beats, a mouth that sucks, eyes that blink and legs that kick, all 
parts out of what the woman gives to make it grow. Without the 
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Another physician, Dr. Marshall Klaus, testified that the "physiologi-
cal" contributions to the infant are just as important as the sperm and egg 
because "[t]he baby can't exist without all three being combined."113 
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE GESTATIONAL MOTHER'S 
ROLE IN REPRODUCTION 
After the egg is fertilized, gestation is a vital factor in continuing the 
reproduction process. A pregnant woman actively participates in the de-
velopment and birth of the fetus. Without this biological exchange be-
tween the mother and child, the fertilized egg would perish. No con-
trolled environment or incubator can duplicate the physiological contribu-
tion to reproduction provided by the gestational mother. 
The joint participation between the mother and fetus begins as early 
as the second week of development, when the embryo is completely 
imbedded in the uterus.114 " [M]atemal blood vessels penetrate the ... 
shell [of the embryo] to enter the intervillous space."lU By the end of 
the third week, the embryo develops small blood vessels. 116 "These ves-
sels in tum ... connectD the placenta117 and the embryo .... Hence, 
when the heart begins to beat in the fourth week of development, the vil-
lous system is ready to supply the embryo proper with the necessary 
nutrients and oxygen"118 from the mother's body. 
The placenta is another example of the joint participation between the 
mother and fetus. It is an active "structure in the uterus . . . through 
which the fetus derives its nourishment. "119 It consists of two portions: 
Id 
healthy pregnant state she maintains, there is no healthy infant. 
Under normal circumstances, the human body rejects anything that 
is foreign to it. All embryos are foreign bodies because the combi-
nation of egg and sperm results in a pattern of DNA different from 
the pregnant woman's own DNA. In order for a woman's body not to 
reject the embryo, substances are secreted which make her body less 
vigilant against foreign intrusions, and which mark the fetus as hers. 
In a process as old as mammalian life itself, she is directed to accept 
the embryo as it implants in her uterus. 
One simply cannot ignore the nine months that transpire between 
implantation of an embryo and birth of a baby, nor can one pretend 
that a pregnant woman's nurturing of a fetus can be reduced to incu-
bation. 
113. Martin Kasindorf, Surrogate Mother'S Rights Backed; Expen: Baby Needs All 3 
Parents, NEWSDAY, Oct. 11, 1990, at IS. 
114. THOMAS W. SADLE~ LANGMAN'S MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 41 (5th ed. 1985). 
115. Id at 54. 
116. Id at 55. 
117. See text below describing the role of the placenta. 
118. SADLER, supra note 114, at 55. 
119. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC DICIlONARY 1408 (16th ed. 1989). 
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fetal and maternal. 120 "[T]he full-grown placenta contains approximately 
150 ml of blood, which is replenished about three or four times per min-
ute" directly from the mother's circulatory system. 121 "At term, the fe-
tus 'extracts' 20-30 cc of oxygen per minute from the maternal circula-
tion. "122 Even a short-term interruption from the maternal oxygen sup-
ply would be fatal to the fetus. 123 
Unlike an incubator, the purpose of which is to maintain favorable 
heat and moisture conditions, the placenta exchanges nutrients and elec-
trolytes (amino acids, free fatty acids, carbohydrates, and vitamins) with 
the maternal circulation. 124 The fetus also acquires from the maternal 
circulation maternal antibodies against various infectious diseases and 
passive immunity against others. 12S Whereas a hatched chick can simply 
be removed from an incubator, "[a]t birth [the placenta] is tom from the 
uterine wall and, approximately 30 minutes after birth of the child, ex-
pelled from the uterine cavity .... Much of the [placenta] remain[s] 
temporarily in the uterus and is expelled with subsequent uterine 
bleedings. "126 
The genes of the genetic parents are not the sole determiners of organ 
development. The gestating woman's actions can also have an important 
impact on organ development. Most congenital127 malformations origi-
nate during the fourth to eighth weeks after conception, when the organs 
are developing.128 The embryo is the most susceptible to factors inter-
fering with individual organ development during this critical time. 129 
The mother has control over some environmental factors that play an 
important role in determining the length and weight of the fetus. l30 Se-
vere malnutrition and heavy smoking, for example, may lead to reduced 
fetal growth. 131 
C. CO~NTATORS' ARGUMENTS 
Commentators also agree that the act of gestation qualifies as a pa-
rental contribution. One commentator, Katha Pollitt, defines "nurturing" 
120. SADLER, supra note 114, at 92. 
121. ld. at 96. 
122. ld. at 97-98. 
123. ld. at 98. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. ld. at 94-95. 
127. "Congenital ... Present at birth." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 402 (16th 
ed. 1989). 
128. SADLER, supra note 114, at 76. 
129. ld. 
130. ld. at 86. 
131. Id. 
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differently than Dr. Harrison,132 although her views on the importance 
of the contributions of pregnancy and childbirth are similar: "'In a debate 
over nature verses nurture, the winner is nature; read the New York 
Times pull-quote. Why defme 'nature' as DNA rather than as the physio-
logical events of pregnancy and birth?"l33 
Pollitt argues that "there's nothing 'natural' about egg donation, 
which involves the hormonal priming of an infertile woman, the extrac-
tion of an egg by delicate technology, fertilization in a dish with mastur-
bated sperm and implantation of the zygote in another [woman].n134 
Pollitt describes pregnancy and childbirth as "the sharing of the body 
and the risking of health, well-being and even life itself that is required 
to bring another life into existence.,,13s She believes "'nurture' is a 
bland social-sciency word that belittles a profound relationship and masks 
the role of women in gender-neutral language. ,,136 
Pollitt also argues that the Johnson137 trial court Judge Parslow 
thoroughly degraded women by equating motherhood with fatherhood -
that is, by redefIning it solely as the contribution of genetic material. 138 
She says he downgraded a mother's other contributions (carrying the 
fetus to term and giving birth) to services rather than integral components 
of parenthood. 139 
Under this legal defmition, a normally pregnant woman is now 
baby-sitting a fetus that happens to be her own ... The picture 
of pregnancy as biological baby-sitting has many sources. It's as 
old as Aeschylus, who had Athena acquit Orestes of matricide in 
The Eumenides on the ground that mothers are merely "nurses" 
of men's seed, and as new as those ubiquitous photos of fetuses 
seeming to float in empty space. 140 
Katha Pollitt further states and sympathizes with sociologist Barbara 
Katz Rothman's view that 
Judge Parslow's decision follows the general pattern of our soci-
ety, in which women's experiences are recognized to the extent 
that they are identical with men's, and devalued or ignored to the 
extent that they are different .... Thus [in Baby M 141], Mary 
132. See supra text accompanying note 112. 




137. See supra text accompanying notes 9·13. 
138. Pollitt, supra note 87, at 825. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). 
230 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:2 
Beth Whitehead won back her parental rights because the New 
Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged her genetic contribution: 
Baby M was half hers. 142 
Pollitt further argues that it is wrong to say that "postmenopausally 
pregnant, egg-donated women achieve parental rights solely by being 
married to the babies' fathers, not through their own contributions." 143 
She believes judges should re-evaluate gestational mothers' claims to 
parentage in light of the information about the value these "women place 
on pregnancy and childbirth and the persistent (if apparently erroneous) 
belief that the resultant babies belong to them."I44 
Alexander M. Capron, a medical ethicist who teaches law and medi-
cine, also commented on the Johnson 145 IVF surrogacy case. He states 
that gestational mothers should have a guaranteed right to change their 
minds, just as women who surrender children for adoption do. l46 "We 
as a society must recognize the fact that (the [surrogate] mother) is a 
flesh-and-blood person and not an incubator."147 
Lori B. Andrews, an American Bar Foundation research fellow spe-
cializing in reproductive technology, agrees that genetics should not be 
the primary determiner of parenthood. She believes more emphasis should 
be placed on the intent of the parties signing the contract. 
IC s an extremely masculine way to view parenthood, to base it 
all on genetics .... The only way to give men parental rights, 
since they don't physically bear children, is through a genetic tie. 
That's how that body of paternity law evolved. But iCs not nec-
essarily a good thing to apply the same standard to a birth moth-
er. 148 
In summary, the testimony of the physicians, the description of gesta-
tion as a necessary part of reproduction as opposed to baby -sitting, and 
the authors' comments all make the same point: Gestation deserves to be 
recognized as a parental contribution that is as important as the genetic 
contribution. Just as the donation of sperm or an egg qualifies the donor 
as a natural (genetic) parent, so should the donation of a womb for IVF 
surrogacy gestation earn parental status for the supplier. In sperm dona-
tion, the law extinguishes the legal paternal rights of the donor and estab-
lishes the legal paternity in the husband of the recipient. 149 In adoption, 
142. Pollitt, supra note 87, at 825. 
143. ld. 
144. ld. 
145. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13. 
146. Efron and Johnson, supra note 108. 
147. ld. 
148. ld. 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 31-45 (artificial insemination/spenn dona-
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the natural mother is given a period of time to revoke her consent before 
her legal rights are permanently extinguished. Likewise, the rights and re-
sponsibilities of gestational mothers should be recognized. Consequently, 
after giving the gestational mother a period of time to revoke her consent 
to adoption, an IVF surrogacy law should permanently extinguish the 
legal maternal rights of the gestational mother and establish legal materni-
ty solely in the genetic mother. 
IV. CURRENT STATUS OF LAWS GOVERNING 
IVF SURROGACY 
Family issues generally are governed by the individual states, ISO al-
though legislatures must bear in mind constitutional issues of the parents' 
right to privacy, their right to procreate,ISI and equal protection between 
couples who practice artificial insemination and those who practice surro-
gacy.lS2 
The current laws on adoption,IS3 artificial insemination,l54 sperm 
donation, ISS and traditional surrogacylS6 do not address the questions 
raised by in vitro fertilization surrogacy. Furthermore, not every state has 
legislation on surrogacy, and those that do often disagree about its vir-
tues. Some states, for example, hold that surrogacy contracts are unen-
forceable; 157 Washington and Utah have gone so far as to say that sur-
rogacy arrangements (for compensation) are criminal. 158 New York and 
Kentucky, on the other hand, have held that surrogacy is not governed by 
state statutes prohibiting payment in connection with adoption. 159 Ar-
tion). 
150. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 16-27 (adoption statutes). 
151. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1965)(Goldberg, J., concurring); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535 (1942). 
152. See infra comment accompanying notes 221-222 (equal protection concerns for 
parental fitness screening and whether marital status may govern who receives parental 
rights). 
153. See supra text accompanying notes 16-27. 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 31-41. 
155. Id 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 46-67. 
157. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9: 2713 (West 1991): t4A contract for surro-
gate motherhood as defined herein shall be absolutely null and shall be void and 
unenforceable as contrary to public policy." 
158. "A surrogate parentage contract entered into for compensation . . . shall be 
void and unenforceable in the state of Washington as contrary to public policy." 
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.240 (West 1991). "Any person, organization, or 
agency who intentionally violates any provision of RCW 26.26.210 through 26.26.260 
shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.250 (West 
1991); see also UTAH CODE ANN. §76-7-204 (1992). 
159. Stanton, supra note 42, at 105. 
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kansas permits surrogacy. 160 Most of these statutes, whether they are for 
or against surrogacy, were written with partial surrogacy in mind and 
afford little security to couples wishing to use in vitro fertilization surro-
gacy.161 
In Baby M, when appellate court Judge Harvey R. Sorkow decided to 
give Baby M to Mr. Stem,l62 he addressed the problem of not having 
uniform laws for traditional surrogacy and the future impact of not solv-
ing the problem. His statements apply equally well to IVF surrogacy: 
The issues and dimensions of surrogacy are still evolving, but it 
is necessary that laws be adopted to give our society a sense of 
definition and direction if the concept is to be allowed to further 
develop. With an increasing number of surrogate births, legisla-
tion can avoid harm to society, the family and the child . . . . If 
there is no law then society will suffer the negative aspects of 
this alternative reproduction vehicle that appears to hold out so 
much hope to the childless who make up a substantial segment of 
our society.163 
The California legislature addressed the question of surrogacy con-
tracts for the ftrSt time in Senate Bill 937, the Alternative Reproduction 
Act of 1992, which passed both houses and was vetoed by the gover-
nor.l64 The proposed general statute encompassed all methods of surro-
gacy as well as egg donors. The statute included a requirement that the 
gestational mother be at least 21 years of age and have had at least one 
160. Rorie Shenn8lly Surrogacy Again Rears Its Head; Are Contracts Enforceable?, 
NATtL L.J., Oct. 8, 1990, at 3 ("Marilyn Adams of the Denver-based National Con-
ference of State Legislatures . . . notes [that] 11 other states have either declared 
commercial sunogacy illegal or simply made the practice difficult or impossible to 
carry out: Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michig8lly Nebraska, Neva-
da, North Dakota, Utah and Washington"). 
161. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9: 2713 (West 1988)(narrowly specific lan-
guage - i.e., "insemination" - might be construed as inapplicable to in vitro fertil-
ization sunogacy): 
B. "Contract for surrogate motherhood" means any agreement where-
by a person not married to the contributor of the sperm agrees for 
valuable consideration to be inseminated, to carry any resulting fetus 
to birth, and then to relinquish to the contributor of the sperm the 
custody and all rights and obligations to the child. 
162. 525 A.2d 1128, 1175 (1987). See also supra text accompanying notes 54-58. 
163. 525 A.2d 1128, 1138 (1987). 
164. S Bill 937, Cal. Reg. Sess. (1991). The Senate passed the bill on August 25, 
1992, and the Assembly passed it two days later. Governor Wilson vetoed SB 937 on 
September 26, 1992. Telephone conversation with California Legislative Bill Room in 
Sacramento, Cal. (Oct. 23, 1992). 
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child. 165 The surrogate and her husband would receive psychological 
counselingl66 and be represented by counsel separate from the intended 
parents. 167 The surrogate would select her physicians and surgeons. 168 
The contract would have had to include specified provisions, including 
inheritancel69 and adoption consene70 of the gestational mother. 
Custodial disagreements would be determined in the best interests of the 
child, and the court would not approve the withdrawal of consent to 
adoption.l71 The statute accounted for the death of the intended parents 
in terms of custodyl72 and life insurance. 173 The intended parents 
would have been required to place funds sufficient to cover all known 
and estimated expenses in an escrow account. 174 It further required the 
intended parents to provide medical and life insurance policies for the 
surrogate. 175 
This bill fulfilled most in vitro fertilization surrogacy purposes, but 
there are two points the statute failed to address. First, under an early 
version of the bill, all remedies of contract or tort law applied to. surro-
gate contracts,176 including specific performance. Under certain circum-
stances these remedies may attempt to force a woman, against current 
constitutional mandates, either to have an abortion or to carry a child to 
term. Secondly, this bill would not have defmed both mothers to be "nat-
ural" mothers. Such an omission may lead to arguments similar to those 
found in the Johnson casel77 and deprive the gestational mother of 
rights normally afforded to other natural parents. For example, under 
certain circumstances, both women in adoption cases and sperm donors 
may revoke consent to terminate their parental rights. 178 
165. S Bill 937. Cal. Reg. Sess .• § 7305 (1991). 
166. Id. § 7317. 
167. Id. § 7303. 
168. Id. § 7318(k). 
169. Id. § 7311. 
170. Id. § 7318(a). 
171. Id. § 7308. 
172. Id. § 7310(c). 
173. Id. § 7318(d)(3). 
174. Id. § 7318(f). 
175. Id. § 7318(d)(I).(2). 
176. Id. § 7309. 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24 and 41. 
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v. PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM STATUTE FOR 
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION SURROGACY 
As one commentator noted about the Baby M case,119 "in order for 
more persons 'to enjoy the benefits of the new technology . . . while 
minimizing the risk of abuse' we need some societal consensus."I80 
This article compiles ideas from current statutes and commentators to 
create a uniform statute. Washington state legislators, for example, have 
enacted a statute criminalizing surrogacy. In doing so, the legislature de-
fmed surrogacy, 181 prohibited some women from entering into surrogacy 
agreements,182 declared such agreements for compensation void and un-
enforceable as contrary to public policy/83 and stated that anyone who 
intentionally violates these provisions shall be guilty of a misdemean-
or. 1M This article uses the Washington defmitions to create the follow-
ing proposal for a uniform statute on in vitro fertilization surrogacy. 
Quotation marks appear around phrases drawn verbatim from the Wash-
ington statute. 
The purpose of the following proposal is to outline rules pertaining to 
IVF surrogacy and clarify that all three people with a direct biological 
contribution to the creation of the child are considered "natural parents." 
Furthermore, in order to avoid protracted custody battles and minimize 
litigation, this law states a clear preference, in the fonn of a rebuttable 
presumption, that the initiating couple retain all the legal rights and duties 
of parents. The gestational mother, however, will be granted three days to 
revoke adoption consent. Therefore, three days after the birth of the child, 
if the gestational mother has not revoked her consent to give up her 
parental rights, her legal parental rights are to be explicitly extinguished, 
as in adoption and sperm donation for artificial insemination. In certain 
cases, her rights may be renewed, if, for example, during pregnancy, the 
gestational mother feels there are substantial changes in the initiating 
couples' home environment that may hann the child, such as the death of 
one of the genetic parents or the divorce of the couple. The following 
proposal attempts to balance the rights of the gestational mother, the 
rights of the initiating parents, the best interest of the child, and consider-
ations of public policy. Because IVF surrogacy is such a new area, con-
stant reassessment will be needed as new evidence becomes available. 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 54-61. 
180. Walter Wadlington. United States: the Continuing Debate about Surrogate 
Parenthood, 27 J. FAM. L. 321, 323 (1988-89)(quoting "the [Baby M] court"). 
181. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.210 (West 1991). 
182. Id. § 26.26.220. 
183. Id. § 26.26.240. 
184. Id § 26.26.250. 
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Accordingly, this proposal encompasses the following five areas: (A) 
definitions of tenns; (B) the rights and duties of the gestational mother; 
(C) the rights and duties of parents initiating the gestational contract; (0) 
the best interests of the child; and (E) the rules that will govern if the 
issue reaches litigation. Footnotes in the statute refer to the source of the 
ideas included in the statute. 
A. DEFINITIONS 
1. "'Compensation' means a payment of money, objects" services, or 
anything else having monetary value except payment of expenses incurred 
as a result of the pregnancy and the actual medical expenses of a [gesta-
tional] mother, and the payment of reasonable attorney fees for the draft-
ing of a [gestational] parentage contract. "18S 
2. "Surrogate gestation" means the medical procedure of implanting 
in a woman's uterus a fertilized egg that is not genetically related to her 
and the subsequent gestation of the child by that woman. 186 
3. "Gestational mother" means a woman who has undergone the 
medical procedure of being artificially inseminated with a fertilized egg 
not genetically related to her and who subsequently gestates the child 
pursuant to an in vitro fertilization surrogate parentage contract. 187 
4. "In vitro fertilization surrogate parentage contract" means a con-
tract, agreement, or arrangement in which a woman agrees to surrogate 
gestation &nd voluntarily to relinquish her parental rights to the child. 188 
5. "Initiating parents" means the couple that has contracted to have 
the man's semen fertilize the woman's egg(s), to have the resulting fertil-
ized egg(s) transplanted into the uterus of a second woman who has 
agreed in this contract to surrogate gestation, and to receive custody of 
the child at the end of gestation. 
6. "Genetic parents" means the initiating parents, if the resulting child 
has been tested to be genetically related to this couple. 
7. "Natural parents" means the woman who donated the egg, the man 
who donated the sperm, and the woman who carried out the gestation. 
B. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE GESTATIONAL MOTHER 
In order to assure that the surrogate parentage contract clearly speci-
fies the responsibilities and obligations of all parties and recognizes the 
gestational mother's wants and needs,189 this model uniform statute con-
185. Id § 26.26.210 (1). 
186. Id § 26.26.210 (2). 
187. Id § 26.26.210 (3). 
188. Id § 26.26.210 (4). 
189. Mindy Ann Baggish, Surrogate Parenting: What We Can Learn from Our 
British Counterparts, 39 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 217, 240 (1989). 
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siders her rights and duties, including all the factors discussed below. 
1. Judicial supervision is required to ensure informed consent of the 
gestational mother. l90 In deciding this issue, factors the court should 
consider include whether the gestational mother: has had legal counseling 
on her rights and duties as a gestational mother; has had psychological 
counseling pertaining to the relinquishment of the child; 191 understands 
all the initiating parents' rights and duties; is at least 21 years of age and 
is not bearing her ftrst child; 192 has had a "cooling off' period after 
signing the contract but before implantation takes place; has consented to 
termination of her parental rights, signed an adoption release,193 and 
understands the length of the grace period during which she may revoke 
her consent to relinquish the child after birth194 (this last factor must be 
both in the contract and verbally acknowledged to the judge). Informed 
consent includes knowledge of the risk that the child may have a genetic 
defect. 
Comment. The gestational mother has a right to know this informa-
tion because it may affect her decision whether or not to carry the child. 
Without this knowledge, there is a greater possibility of abortion or bring-
ing a child into the world who may not be happy. 
2. If the gestational mother is married, her husband must give written, 
informed consent and follow any procedures necessary to rebut the pre-
sumption that he is the father of the· child. 
3. The gestational mother may revoke her consent to give up her 
parental rights within three days after birth. If she elects this option, there 
are three legal parents. A hearing will be held to decide visitation and 
custody rights in the best interest of the child, and the court shall approve 
the withdrawal of consent to adoption. 195 
Comment. A model statute that recognizes the gestational mother as a 
natural parent would have to take into consideration adoption laws that 
grant the mother a grace period to change her mind about giving up the 
child after it is bom. l96 In adoption, the mother is the only mother, and 
the adopting parents usually have no biological link - and hence no 
equal parental rights - to the child. Here, both women contribute to the 
reproductive process, and all three people with a biological link are con-
sidered natural parents. Even though the law recognizes a sperm donor as 
the natural father of the child, and "legislation . . . extinguishes the legal 
190. Stanton, supra note 42, at 117. 
191. Id. at 117-18. 
192. S Bill 937, Cal. Reg. Sess., § 7305 (1991). 
193. Id. § 7318(a). 
194. The grace period here is similar to the one given to birth mothers in adoption. 
195. S Bill 937, Cal. Reg. Sess., § 7308 (1991). 
196. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24. 
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paternal rights of the donor"l97 without a grace period, this should not 
be the case in IVF surrogacy because IVF surrogacy is more analogous to 
adoption. The gestational mother has undergone much physical trauma 
while supplying the safety and support for the child's future life outside 
the womb. She may have established physical or emotional bonds to the 
child. Therefore, contrary to egg and sperm donation agreements l98 and 
similar to adoption, there should be a time frame of temporary custody 
affording the surrogate mother the right to revoke her consent. Once this 
statutory period for revocation has passed, all legal rights shall vest in the 
genetic parents. 
4. Blood and tissue testing of the child shall be required after its 
birth. If the child is genetically related to the gestational mother and not 
genetically. related to the initiating parents, the gestational mother shall be 
awarded full custody. 
Comment. This statute considers that the mother may not want to 
give away a child that belongs both genetically and gestationally to her, 
and the initiating parents may not want to take such a child. As a protec-
tion for both the genetic parents and the gestational parent, blood and 
genetic tissue testing should be required after the birth to ensure that the 
child is genetically related to the initiating parents. l99 If the child has 
no genetic link to the initiating parents, then the gestational mother will 
be declared the legal mother with all the accompanying rights, responsi-
bilities, and duties. Furthermore, if the child does not belong to the initi-
ating parents, the genetic and gestational mother should pay all the medi-
cal expenses incurred during her pregnancy and delivery, but she would 
not be liable for the fees incurred for the IVF procedures. 200 
5. The gestational mother and her husband must have legal represen-
tation independent from the initiating parents. 201 
Comment. This provision guards against exploitation of the gestation-
al mother. The initiating parents may contract to pay for her lawyer, 
although the attorney must be sure to alleviate any conflict of interest, as 
is done in other situations where one party pays for another party's legal 
fees (for example, an insurance company defense attorney or a 
corporation's counsel defending one of its officers). 
197. SHALEV, supra note 40, at 1178. 
198. See supra text accompanying notes 31-41 (no waiting period). 
199. Stanton, supra note 42, at 112. 
200. If the gestational mother was checked for pregnancy before implantation of the 
fertilized egg was attempted, and the child is also the gestational mother's genetic 
child, then the implantation did not work. Unless there is proof that it was her fault 
that the IVF attempt did not work, there is no reason for the gestational mother to 
pay back the initiating parents. 
201. S Bill 937, Cal. Reg. Sess., § 7303 (1991). 
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6. The gestational mother is to be paid for her services.202 Services 
will vary from case to case, depending on the success of the pregnancy 
and birth. Services may include: allowing the gestational mother's cycle 
to be synchronized with the genetic mother's; undergoing several attempt-
ed implantations; becoming pregnant; surviving a miscarriage, sickness, 
and other physical traumas of being pregnant; labor, childbirth, or Caesar-
ean section; recovering from childbirth or surgery; and risks of diabetes, 
high blood pressure, and death. A contract is not to include tenns that 
vary the compensation according to the survival or sex of the child be-
cause this would tend to equate surrogacy services with baby-selling.203 
"If the process ends early, she shall still recover for the services rendered 
up to that date . .,204 
7. The gestational mother selects her physicians and surgeons. 205 
8. The intended parents must provide medical and life insurance 
policies for the gestational mother.206 
9. The gestational mother's husband (or other partner in a significant 
relationship) must also go through psychiatric evaluation and counseling. 
Comment. A husband may find it difficult to support his wife while 
she gestates and gives birth to a child unrelated to him. Marital discord 
between the surrogate mother and her husband may increase the potential 
for medical problems occurring in the pregnancy or problems in the ges-
tational mother's decision to relinquish custody of the child. The initiat-
ing parents may contract to pay for reasonable fees incurred for counsel-
ing of the husband concerning the surrogate pregnancy. 
10. The gestational mother must sign a release allowing the initiating 
parents access to any genetic, psychological, and medical records that 
may be of importance in their decision to hire a particular woman. 
11. Specific perfonnance may not be a remedy for' the initiating par-
ents to force the gestational mother to carry the child to tenn. 207 Her 
202. Baggish, supra note 189, at 236-37. See also Book Review, 102 HARV. L. 
REv. 1074, 1078 (1989)(reviewing MARTHA A. FIELD, SELLING ONE'S BIRTH-RIGHTS 
(1988» [hereinafter FIELD] (little or low pay is oppressive and "fits into our tradition 
of noncompensation for women's work"; on the other hand, high pay and/or ~eco­
nomic necessity coerces people into accepting a wide range of dangerous or un-
pleasant jobs"). 
203. Ramona Ripston, One Baby, Three Parents: Whose Rights Prevail?, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 17, 1990, at B7 (although a woman may be compensated for her surrogacy 
services, the child born from this arrangement "has the right not to be sold as chat-
tel"). 
204. Baggish, supra note 189, at 237 n.128. 
205. S Bill 937, Cal. Reg. Sess., § 7318(k)(1991). 
206. [d. § 7318(d)(I),(2). 
207. Also to be recognized are a woman's constitutional rights to control her body 
without outside interference. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Robert 
Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)(unconstitu-
tiona I to require a married woman seeking an abortion to sign a statement indicating 
that she has notified her husband). 
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rights would be limited, however, by current constitutional views of fetal 
rights and liability for breach of contract to the initiating parents. Liabili-
ty is limited to the cost of the IVF treatment undertaken in reliance on 
her participation. 
Comment. This subpart reflects that a woman's constitutional right to 
choose whether or not to continue a pregnancy cannot be contracted 
away.2OS Further, this subpart would prevent exploitation of gestational 
mothers by recognizing their complete control over their reproductive 
choices. A model statute, therefore, would allow the contract to be ter-
minated by the gestational mother if she chose to have an abortion. 
12. The intended parents must place funds sufficient to cover all 
known and estimated expenses in an escrow account. 209 
13. Initiating parents owe a duty to protect the safety of the gestation-
al mother and the possible child. Initiating parents must be screened for 
diseases that may be transmittable to the gestational mother or the 
child.210 
C. RIGHTS AND DUfIES OF INITIATING PARENTS 
To provide the initiating parents security in the surrogate parentage 
contract, the contract should clearly specify the responsibilities and obli-
gations of all parties, including all the factors discussed below. 
1. Judicial supervision is required to ensure informed consent of the 
initiating parents.211 In deciding the issue of informed consent, the court 
should consider whether the initiating parents have had legal counseling 
on their rights and duties as parents; have had psychological counseling 
to probe for unconscious hostile feelings about another woman gestating 
their fertilized egg that may later cause them to harm or resent the child; 
and understand the gestational mother's rights and duties. 
2. This statute provides the initiating parents with a signed release 
allowing them access to genetic, psychological, and medical records that 
may be important in their decision to hire a particular woman. 
Comment. Initiating parents have the right to know if the gestational 
mother has had previous physical trouble with pregnancies or is predis-
posed to any kind of drug use, depression, or ill-health. 
3. To ensure that this child is genetically related to the initiating 
208. FIELD, supra note 202, at 1077. 
209. S Bill 937, Cal. Reg. Sess., § 7318(£)(1991). 
210. See, e.g., Stiver v. Parker, 61 U.S.L.W. 1041 (6th Cir. 1992)(surrogate mother 
sued broker when she was apparently infected with cytomegalovirus from genetic 
father's sperm; surrogate mother and her husband subsequently had child that had 
microencephaly). 
211. Stanton, supra note 42, at 117. 
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parents, blood and genetic tissue testing is required after the birth.212 If 
the child has no genetic link to the initiating parents, then the contract is 
void, and the sun-ogate mother owes the initiating parents reasonable 
compensation for payments made to any person or institution in connec-
tion with this pregnancy and birth, excluding the extra expenses of the in 
vitro fertilization attempt. 
Comment. The gestational mother cannot be held liable for any failed 
implantation procedures, and, in light of the fact that IVF has a low 
success rate,213 she cannot be held liable for the costs of the in vitro 
fertilization attempts. 
4. To protect the initiating parents from a contest of the surrogate 
parentage contract by the gestational mother on the basis of lack of in-
formed consent, there shall be a judicial decree of the gestational 
mother's informed consent (and of her husband's informed consent if she 
is married). 
5. The genetic parents may not revoke their decision to take custody 
of the child after it is conceived. 
Comment. Under this statute, both genetic parents are viewed like the 
sole father in a natural pregnancy. When a woman is pregnant, she has 
the constitutional right to control her body; the father may not demand an 
abortion for any reason (i.e. change of mind about being a parent, unsat-
isfied with the sex of the child, birth defects), and he has the legal obli-
gation to support the child if it is born alive. This statute explicitly states 
its acknowledgment that the initiating parents are restricted by current 
constitutional laws from governing the gestational mother's conduct and 
will be under legal obligation to accept custody of the child from the 
gestational mother. 
6. If the gestational mother chooses to have an abortion against the 
initiating parents' wishes, the abortion cannot be enjoined. There can be 
no specific performance to carry the child to term.214 Initiating parents 
may, however, hold the gestational mother liable for breach of contract. 
Other contract remedies - monetary damages for lost expectation and 
emotional distress, restitution, and reliance - may be levied against 
whichever party breaches the contract. 
7. Initiating couples must have medical proof that it would be danger-
ous or impossible for the initiating mother to gestate the child. 
Comment. Since the purpose of this statute is to allow infertile cou-
ples to create a family, couples may not exploit IVF surrogacy to avoid 
the burdens of pregnancy. Some commentators state that allowing surro-
212. [d. at 112. 
213. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
214. See supra text accompanying notes 207-08. 
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gate parentage contracts made by fertile couples will commercialize chil-
dren and exploit women.2lS Others, like Katha Pollitt, however, believe 
this fear may be blown out of proportion.216 This statute considers the 
possibility that the former commentators' fears may occasionally be justi-
fied. For public policy reasons, therefore, this statute requires women to 
show medical proof that it would be dangerous or impossible for them to 
bear children.217 A surrogate parentage contract entered into by a cou-
ple, the wife of whom is able to bear children naturally, should be held 
void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy. 
8. The intended parents must provide medical and life insurance 
policies for the gestational mother.218 
9. The intended parents must place funds sufficient to cover all 
known and estimated expenses in an escrow account.219 
10. Initiating parents owe a duty to protect the safety of the gestation-
al mother and the possible child. Initiating parents must be screened for 
diseases that may be transmittable to the gestational mother or the 
child.220 
D. lNTEREsT OF THE CHILD 
This model uniform statute recognizes the importance of the child's 
right to a stable environment and takes the following precautions. 
1. Judicial supervision is required to ensure that the initiating parents 
are emotionally stable enough to endure the unique stresses associated 
with IVF surrogacy and that they have been screened for parental fitness 
215. See, e.g., Kissam, supra note 3, at 615 ("paid surrogacy would help entrench 
stereotypes of women as 'vessels of the race' in the sense that women's wombs are 
being 'rented' for reproductive services to a patriarchal purpose"). 
216. 
When ethicists fret that professional women may resort to gestational 
surrogacy to avoid "putting their careers on hold," they betray more 
than antiquated views about the capacities of pregnant women to get 
out of bed in the morning. They reveal their own assumption that 
pregnancy is a trivial, empty experience with nothing positive about it 
except the end product, the genetically connected baby. They then 
compound the insult by attributing this view to a demonized fantasy 
of working women - cold, materialistic, selfish, corrupted by "male 
values" - that is, those held by the ethicists themselves. Is there any 
evidence that working women - even MBAs, even lawyers - see 
pregnancy this way? Who do the pundits think are mobbing infertility 
clinics and signing on for donated eggs? A couple needs two incomes 
just to pay the doctors. 
Pollitt, supra note 87. 
217. Id 
218. S Bill 937, Cal. Reg. Sess., § 7318(d)(I),(2) (1991). 
219. Id § 7318(£). 
220. See supra note 210. 
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using factors that are considered in adoption hearings.221 Initiating par-
ents shall be counseled about the psychological stresses children and 
parents may encounter from in vitro fertilization surrogacy. 222 
Comment. Using the same strict factors for IVF surrogacy parent 
screening that are considered in adoption hearings suggests an equal 
protection problem. In artificial insemination, when the man is infertile, 
no such screening is required; therefore, requiring strict screening of 
initiating couples when the woman is infertile may violate equal protec-
tion. Also, the screening shall not be as strict as in adoption because, 
unlike adoption, the IVF surrogacy initiating couple is related to the 
child. But this statute requires some screening because of the state inter-
est in protecting the best interest of the child. 
2. Initiating parents must be informed of their rights, responsibilities, 
and duties as parents as defined by the state in which the surrogacy is 
arranged. 
3. The identity of the gestational mother shall be sealed because it 
may create confusion and mixed emotions for the child to know the 
gestational mother during childhood.223 
4. This statute does not endorse a total disregard for the mother-infant 
bond. Separation of the IVF surrogacy child from one of its natural par-
ents during its formative years is deemed the best method of providing a 
stable childhood environment. As some states allow adopted children to 
do, however, the IVF surrogacy child may later decide to seek out the 
gestational mother. Iudicial records, therefore, shall be kept of the surro-
gacy arrangement and of the identities of the parties. When the child is of 
the age of majority and the record indicates the gestational mother's 
consent, the child may obtain her name and seek her out. 
5. To account for the death of the natural parents, the contract must 
include specified provisions, including inheritance224 from any natural 
parent, life insurance22s of the intended parents, and custodr26 of the 
child. 
6. Initiating parents owe a duty to protect the safety of the gestational 
221. These factors will depend on the individual state. 
222. Child welfare experts fear that children from surrogacy arrangements may ex-
perience problems similar to those experienced by adopted children. See supra text 
accompanying note 30. These include: learning difficulties, behavioral and psychologi-
cal problems, and confusion over their identities and backgrounds. ld. 
223. Catherine Gewertz, Psychiatry Professor Doubts Surrogate's Emotional Bond, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1990, at B1 (Dr. Justin Call, child psychology expert, believes 
that a child should start out life peacefully, not in a tug-of-war that may be created 
if the suttogate mother has visitation rights. "Shared parenting" arrangements may 
upset a child's values). 
224. S Bill 937, Cal. Reg. Sess., § 7311 (1991). 
225. Id. § 7318(d)(3). 
226. Id. § 7310(c). 
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mother and the possible child. Initiating parents must be screened for 
diseases that may be transmittable to the gestational mother or the 
child. 227 
E. LmGATION 
If a gestational mother believes she would be a more fit parent than 
the initiating parents and chooses to sue for custody of the child, there 
shall be a judicial hearing. The burden of proof is on the gestational 
mother to prove she is the more fit parent, since this statute grants the 
genetic parents the presumption of custody (not presumption of fitness). 
The court shall decide the fitness of each parent in accordance with the 
governing rules of its jurisdiction. It should, however, consider more than 
economic factors and shall not be swayed by the cultural and social affID-
ities of any of the parties, including the judge.228 
CONCLUSION 
In vitro fertilization surrogacy is a new method of becoming a parent. 
It is independent from adoption, sperm donation, and traditional surroga-
cy. Because of the gestational mother's vital contribution to reproduction 
- that of developing the fertilized egg to the new born infant - equat-
ing her to an incubator demeans her role in the reproduction of the child 
and treats her as an object. IVF surrogacy creates a third natural parent. 
As a parent, the gestational mother would normally have all the 
rights, responsibilities, and duties required by the laws of the state in 
which she resides. The purpose of in vitro fertilization surrogacy, howev-
er, is to help infertile couples create a family, just as adoption, egg dona-
tion, and artificial insemination help other couples create families. In the 
latter three instances, one or both of the natural parents must give up all 
parental rights. In adoption, however, some states recognize the bond 
between mother and child by allowing two exceptions: (1) during a spe-
cific period of time after the birth legal consent for adoption may be 
withheld and (2) when the child reaches the age of majority he or she 
may attempt to contact the natural parents. 
This article suggests an IVF surrogacy statute that recognizes the 
gestational mother as a natural parent and allows her a statutory period to 
change her mind concerning the relinquishment of her parental rights. 
The proposed statute also extends the gestational mother the right to 
prove she would be a more qualified parent than the genetic parents. She 
is accorded parental status, but, as in adoption, with her voluntary consent 
and with a period of time to revoke after the child is born, her rights 
227. See supra note 210. 
228. FIELD, supra note 202, at 1077-78. 
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may be tenninated. The child is allowed to contact the gestational mother 
after reaching the age of majority if the gestational mother left written 
consent in the sealed documents of her identity. At that time, as in adop-
tion cases where the child has chosen to seek the natural mother, the two 
parties may form a relationship. Any other rights, responsibilities, or 
duties will not be restored except by proper action of law. 
Because IVF surrogacy is sufficiently different from other forms of 
creating a family, it should have its own body of law to govern its use in 
order to prevent confusion and unjust results from the misapplication of 
rules from adoption, artificial insemination, and sperm donation. 
